State-enabled reversals threaten settled expectations
The recent Gazette notification introducing the Goa Comunidade Land Development and Regulation Rules, 2025 marks a turning point in the relationship between Gaonkars and the age-old institutions of the Comunidades. While ostensibly framed as a financial lifeline for struggling Comunidades, these Rules empower the diversion of large tracts of community land to private developers through competitive bidding. Simultaneously, Article 31-A inserted by the Goa Legislative Diploma No. 2070 (Amendment) Act, 2025 establishes an automatic reversion mechanism, enabling the annulment of prior grants if land is deemed not to have been utilised for its designated purpose.
From guardians of tradition to market intermediaries
Comunidades, which historically safeguarded local self-governance and equitable land access, are now statutorily transformed into agents facilitating market-based redistribution. The Rules mandate a minimum of 10,000 square metres for any development and reserve only 20% of the retained 50% land for affordable housing to Gaonkars. The remainder, transferred to the highest bidder, bypasses democratic land planning safeguards. These transformations raise profound constitutional concerns under Article 14 (equality before law) and Article 300A (protection of property), as they privilege developer interests over traditional rights.
Inherent redundancy and excess of legislative power
What renders Article 31-A particularly vulnerable to judicial review is its legislative redundancy. As per Chapter III, Articles 341 to 346 of the unamended Code of Comunidades, there already exists a detailed statutory mechanism for inspecting land use and reverting unused plots. These provisions backed by procedural safeguards and penalties for non-compliance made it unnecessary to introduce a parallel, automatic forfeiture clause without the due process earlier prescribed. The Amendment Act of 2025 thereby violates the rule against excessive legislation, lacking a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved.
The looming threat: real-world manifestations in Poinguinim and Loliem
Two recent developments reinforce the public interest concerns raised in PILWP No. 811 of 2025 (F). As per local news reports, the Comunidades of Poinguinim and Loliem have initiated steps to revert earlier grants and enter agreements for land development with private builders. Gaonkars in these villages have expressed fears over the legality, transparency, and fairness of the bidding and land reversion processes. Their apprehensions bear testimony to the PIL’s foresight and highlight the real-world constitutional stakes of unchecked legislative amendments.
Judicial observations now provide a remedial pathway
Significantly, the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay at Goa, while dismissing the petition on 16th June 2025, did not foreclose relief. In its Order, the Bench expressly stated that “if parties are aggrieved, they can approach the court to seek appropriate remedies.” This liberty now enables affected Gaonkars in Poinguinim, Loliem, and elsewhere to initiate fresh writ proceedings under Article 226, directly challenging administrative actions taken under the umbrella of the impugned amendment and the 2025 Rules.
What lies ahead for Goa’s legal landscape?
The cumulative impact of Article 31-A and the Development Rules not only disturbs settled legal expectations but also compromises constitutional protections of property and equality. If these measures are not subjected to serious judicial scrutiny, they may establish a precedent for converting Goa’s communitarian land heritage into a market commodity. Public-spirited citizens, local communities, and legal activists now carry the task of invoking constitutional remedies before irreversible changes are cemented in practice.
The colonial origin of the comunidades
The Comunidades of Goa trace their origin to pre-Portuguese village collectives, which were later codified and integrated into the Portuguese legal system. As formalised under the Foral charters and later under the Code of Comunidades, these institutions served as collective custodians of village land, tasked with its equitable distribution and management. Each Gaunkar family was allotted a share in the communal land, and decisions regarding land use, leases, and revenue sharing were made democratically through the Managing Committee and General Body. The essence of the Comunidade system lay in its ability to balance private cultivation rights with community control, while ensuring accountability through public records and fiscal audits. Throughout Portuguese rule, the Comunidades enjoyed legal clarity and administrative continuity, rooted in a well-structured and publically accountable statutory scheme.
Legal jargon now masks opportunism
In the post-Liberation period, the State gradually weakened these structures under the guise of modernisation. The insertion of Article 31-A and the introduction of the 2025 Development Rules signal a shift from public trust to private transaction. Instead of upholding the original communitarian ethos, the Government now permits the same Comunidade bodies often lacking transparency or legal training to determine land use, issue public tenders, and approve developmental projects with minimal checks. These statutory modifications, couched in bureaucratic legalese, create opportunities for arbitrary decision-making and enable private profiteering from what was historically held in common trust. The broad and undefined powers now vested in these bodies blur the line between governance and discretion, replacing the participatory legacy of the Comunidade with technocratic capture. Left unchecked, such interpretative distortions risk eroding a centuries-old legal institution into a mechanism for land alienation.
