The rapid rise of Muslim Brotherhood to power in Egypt afterthe deposing of Hosni Mubarak last year prompted many observers to see anIslamist Egypt as inevitable. After all, the Muslim Brotherhood was the bestorganized and most popular political party in Egypt, the opposition wasdivided, there was little Western support for the secular opposition and theUnited States welcomed Muslim Brotherhood delegations to the White House andworked openly with President Mohammed Morsi to achieve a ceasefire in theIsrael-Hamas War. All this seemed to many to be a rough replay of the 1979Iranian Revolution.
Yet, as the mass demonstrations against the MuslimBrotherhood recently in Tahrir Square and across Egypt have shown, an IslamicEgypt, while still likely, is far from inevitable.
Charismatic leaders with strong political intuition, likeMao, Lenin, Tito, Castro and Ayatollah Khomeini, usually lead successfulrevolutions. They personified theirrevolutions and inspired the masses to coalesce around their leadership.
Morsi is no Ayatollah Khomeini, a religious leader whoembodied revolutionary mysticism in his a triumphant return to Tehran in 1979after 14 years in exile. Morsi lacks charisma and spent his life pursuing aPh.D. at USC and chairing an Egyptian engineering school until 2010. His abruptand radical moves do not reflect an adroit understanding of what to do whenfaced with a crisis.
The Ayatollah returned to an Iran rich in oil and gasrevenue and quickly expropriated the great wealth the Shah had accumulated. Heused this financial leverage effectively. Morsi and the Brotherhood arestewards of a very poor country. Egypt’s GNP is $80 billion and its stockmarket is valued at $40 billion, two measures of national wealth that, bycomparison, are less than 1 percent of the United States.
Equally important is the lack of powerful enemies againstwhich to rouse the masses. Khomeini cast the US as the “Great Satan” and Israelas the “Little Satan.” By contrast, Morsi, through his negotiations with theUnited States and willingness to accept its money, looks more like an ally ofthe “Great Satan.” He has pledged to maintain the Camp David Peace Accord withIsrael. He also lacks a war with another country, such as the Iran had withIraq from 1980-1988, as a strategy around which he could rally the population.
The Shiites in Iran, after a lengthy period of perceivedpersecution, came together around the idea that a revolutionary Iran wouldrestore them to their “proper” role in a Sunni-dominated region. This appealwas reinforced by the frequent and powerful interference in their internalaffairs by England, the United States and Russia. Egypt lacks such a history.What’s more, it has 8 million Christian Copts, a major ethnoreligious group,many of whose members oppose the Brotherhood.
The Muslim Brotherhood also faces a significantly strongermilitary than post-Shah Iran; a million-man security force, multi-million manbureaucracy, independent courts and media. Unlike Iran, Egypt lacks theresources to provide serious help to the impoverished masses. Female illiteracyis more than 40 percent and 88 percent of the population have no books athomes, save for schoolbooks for their children.
Finally, having seen what happened in Islamic revolutions inIran (1979), Afghanistan (1996) and Gaza (2006), the Brotherhood’s secularopponents are far more likely to come out and fight for their interests.
The recent flight of Mohammed Morsi from his presidentialpalace and the massive number of demonstrators in front of the palace andelsewhere does not augur well for Morsi. The Muslim Brotherhood faces either a protracted battle forconsolidation of its power or a possibility of ultimately being ousted frompower. Either way, an Islamic Egypt may not seem so inevitable anymore.
Jonathan Adelman is a professor at the Josef Korbel Schoolof International Studies at the University of Denver.
