Over the past year, it has become significantly moredifficult and even downright dangerous for Russians to organize or participatein any political activity not sanctioned by the authorities. This is a turn forthe worse that surely deserves attention. But a rising tide of anti-Russiarhetoric from Washington and Russia’s bristling response underscore thedifficulty of balancing human rights and democracy with other vital nationalinterests in an important international relationship.
The US Congress is already determined to enact new sanctionsagainst Russian officials and businesses as a quid-pro-quo for lifting a ColdWar-era ban on normal trading relations with Moscow. Some in the Obamaadministration have offered the unhelpful alternative of creating a “democracyfund” to channel U.S. money to the very groups the Russian government mostfears. Mitt Romney has labeled Russia a geopolitical foe and promised to “dismantlethe reset” if he is elected. All of this is cause for concern that, no matterwho wins in November, U.S.-Russia relations are drifting toward a moreconfrontational posture. This must not happen. Productive relations betweenWashington and Moscow are important for advancing vital US national interests.Russia disagrees with America’s assessment of the situation in Syria, andexerts its influence in its Eurasian neighborhood in ways that raise concernsfor Washington.
But these differences should not conceal the progress thathas been made on pressing regional security issues from the Middle East to EastAsia. More than 100,000 NATO soldiers in Afghanistan rely for food, fuel andammunition on a supply route that runs through Russia. These are not reasons toignore the Kremlin’s crackdown on political dissent, but they should bereminders that any US response demands a considered and honest assessment ofthe costs and benefits for the relationship as a whole.
So how can Washington have an impact on Russia’s domesticpolitical problems without poisoning the atmosphere of the relationship orgiving up on vital national interests? The answer lies in a venerable foreignpolicy tradition going back to the Cold War and before: the art of negotiation.In the 1980s, even after labeling the Soviet Union an “evil empire,” PresidentRonald Reagan conducted multi-track talks with Moscow in which the UnitedStates simultaneously pursued nuclear arms control, managed regional conflictsand liberated Jewish refuseniks, Baltic nationalists and other politicaldissidents.
Subsequent US presidents have shown that it is possible tofoster a cooperative relationship with a less democratic state that can, in theend, help to advance a wide range of U.S. interests, including human rights. Inthe 1990s, the Clinton administration, with strong support from Sen. JohnMcCain, normalised relations with Vietnam, moving past the painful legacy ofthe war in order to find opportunities for cooperation and progress. Washingtoncould not require Vietnam to abandon its one-party Communist system as aprerequisite for relations, but by using the leverage of trade and aid, theUnited States was able to make significant progress on hard issues, includingthe fate of missing servicemen. In this context, the Vietnamese offeredconcessions on human rights issues, including enhanced religious freedom.
The pragmatic approach of using negotiations to advance bothinterests and values culminated in a bilateral trade agreement concluded in2000 “ and implemented by Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush. President Bushalso embraced the pragmatic approach with his creation of the President’sEmergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003. A number of the 15 “focuscountries” targeted to receive large amounts of U.S. aid to combat HIV/AIDSwere not democracies, despite considerable domestic criticism. But theadministration found that its offer of cooperation on the urgent problem ofHIV/AIDS helped to increase its leverage to push for reforms more than a hectoringapproach would have.
It is still possible to negotiate with Russia for progresson democracy, rule of law and human rights, especially if Washington makes gooduse of the tools it already has, such as the Bilateral Presidential Commission,which facilitates high-level official and nongovernmental contacts on issuesranging from counterterrorism to prison reform, and provides a platform tonegotiate the issues.
Yet the more that rhetoric from Washington depicts Russia asthe problem, the more it discredits an approach that could win concessions inthe context of wider partnership. Likewise, legislation that restricts tiesbetween the United States and Russia makes it much harder for either side torespond effectively when problems or opportunities arise. It may be morally satisfying for USpoliticians to criticise Russia, but moral outrage without a smart negotiatingstrategy will do little to advance vital US interests “ including democracy andhuman rights.
Matthew A. Rojansky is deputy director of theRussia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.Nikolas Gvosdev is a professor of national security affairs at the US Naval WarCollege
