DR UBALDINA NORONHA
A bridge is meant to connect two places. A flyover promises something more, a faster journey, fewer interruptions and relief from traffic. The newly opened Porvorim elevated corridor was expected to provide precisely that. Instead, within days of its opening, it became associated with confusion, restrictions and tragedy.
Afloat are questions about the design and management of entry and exit points, the interaction between the elevated corridor and service roads and the movement of two-wheelers. The authorities have subsequently restricted access, banned two-wheelers and closed certain entry and exit points. In addition, an expert team is called in to study the traffic arrangements and recommend corrective measures. This raises an important question: Why do people sometimes act first and examine the consequences later?
The most relevant explanation is the 'planning fallacy'. This refers to the tendency to underestimate the time, effort, resources and difficulties required to complete a task. People often focus on the successful outcome they hope for and overlook the obstacles that could interfere with it. A public road is a system used by people who drive at different speeds, misunderstand signs, change lanes suddenly, hesitate, take wrong turns and sometimes behave irresponsibly. A road is safe when its design anticipates ordinary human error. This is where the planning fallacy occurs. The planners may have concentrated on whether the corridor could ease traffic congestion and travel time, without giving sufficient attention to driver perception and behaviour.
Optimism bias
The planning fallacy is often associated with optimism bias. Optimism bias is the tendency to believe that negative events are less likely to happen, especially to oneself. The authorities may acknowledge that traffic merges, unclear signage or sudden lane changes can be dangerous, yet assume that an accident will not occur. Such reasoning may be understandable in an individual making a minor decision. It becomes dangerous when applied to public infrastructure.
Another relevant concept is overconfidence bias. This is the tendency to have excessive confidence in one’s own judgement or ability. In this situation, overconfidence might take the form of assuming that motorists would understand the arrangement immediately, that traffic would organise itself or that any difficulties could be corrected after the corridor was opened. Overconfidence may also appear as an assumption that a technically impressive project will automatically function well in practice.
Reactive problem-solving
The response of authorities after the accident illustrates a response called reactive problem-solving. It is a mode of responding in which action is taken after a problem becomes visible. Post-accident investigation is valuable. Technical knowledge is most useful when it is brought into the process early. Traffic modelling, simulation and observation could have identified possible accident-prone areas before the road was opened.
Also in play is hindsight bias. Hindsight bias is the tendency, after an event has occurred, to see it as having been predictable or obvious. After the accident, the entry-exit confusion may appear self-evidently dangerous. But the fact that a problem is clear after an accident does not necessarily mean that it was equally obvious beforehand.
Pre-mortem strategy
A simple method known as a ‘pre-mortem’ can help reduce this tendency. Before beginning a project, decision-makers assume that it has already failed and ask appropriate questions. A pre-mortem requires disciplined imagination. In the case of the Porvorim corridor, such an exercise might have raised questions about unclear signage, sudden merging, the movement of two-wheelers, unfamiliar road layouts and driver speed. The lesson is that predictable forms of human error should be treated as part of the design problem.
The Porvorim corridor therefore offers more than a lesson in road engineering. It offers a lesson in decision-making. A flyover is not safe merely because it stands. It is safe when people can use it without having to decode it under pressure.
(The writer is Associate Professor, Department of Psychology, St Xavier’s College, Mapusa)
