On January 11, French military forces entered Mali, takingand inflicting casualties in a war as sudden as it is important. Even at thisearly stage, broadly applicable lessons can be drawn from the conflict.Although the future course of the fighting is laden with risks, skillfuldiplomacy can turn it into a major opportunity in the struggle againstinternational terrorism.
The French intervention was prompted by the combinedoffensive towards Bamako, the capital of Mali, of the three jihadiorganisations which seized control of the northern half of the country lastyear. This unforeseen attack prompted the president of Mali to ask France forimmediate help. One lesson, as old as the history of war, but as oftenforgotten, is that one should not expect one’s enemy to cooperate. The generalassumption had been that the jihadis would not move until a Western-trainedAfrican force was ready to free northern Mali next fall.
Given the situation on the ground, only an instantaneouscounterstrike could have prevented the jihadis from seizing the capital withindays. Were Bamako to fall, Mali could form the basis of what some call“Sahelistan” “ a safe haven for terrorist fighters akin to pre-9/11 Afghanistan,with a similar threat potential to both the region and to the West, notablyEurope. Although French forces garrisoned in West Africa did not possess thelatest in combat aircraft, speed was deemed to be of the essence. High stakesentailed high risks. It was only later that state-of-the-art Rafale jets andTiger helicopters started being sent to the theater of operations.
The French have blocked and smashed one of the jihadicolumns, while the other arm of the jihadi pincer attack is being dealt with atthe time of this writing. Another consideration was the crucial importance ofeffective in-place forces and the political decision-making enabling theirprompt release. France is one of only a handful of countries which has thatspeed of reaction. This in turn confirms another lesson, drawn by DonaldRumsfeld (admittedly Europe’s least favorite American politician) after 9/11:it is the mission that makes the coalition.
The cast of France’s military supporters ranges from theEconomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to the United States, andmany in between. But NATO as such is absent “ as is, for the time being, theEuropean Union. The EU in particular has proven yet again that the words “speedand urgency” don’t figure in its lexicon. Finally, the capability gaps thatbecame evident in the war in Libya continue to bedevil the French “ in-flightrefueling and strategic reconnaissance (notably in terms of drones) are a bigproblem and US help in these areas is always appreciated.
For the time being, the war poses few political problems.Domestic support in France is broad, and the French president is enjoying whatI’ve called “springtime in Hollande.”
Behind a world-weary facade, the French support theirsoldiers, revile terrorism and accept casualties if the mission is seen as justand achievable. The United Nations Security Council and the African Union havebeen supportive, as have all of France’s allies.
But such popularity has a due date. If operations drag onand casualties pile up to no obvious advantage, the mood will sour. In the caseof Mali, several conditions have to be met simultaneously to avoid anAfghanistan-style outcome. First, the number of French soldiers must notincrease beyond the 2,500 now being deployed in Mali, and their prime functionshould be to fight the jihadis, not to occupy territory.
Holding territory should be the responsibility of Mali andECOWAS troops from neighboring countries, supported by training and assistancefrom the West. Second, the momentum of the current fighting should besustained. Far from their logistical bases, the jihadi columns (with some 150vehicles each) are being savaged. As al-Qaida’s affiliates and their jihadiallies try to head back to the Sahara, they should not be allowed to recover. Inother words, the remaining weeks of the dry season should involve risk-takingby ground forces and air operations in order to break the enemy in the north.
That will entail some serious diplomatic footwork to ensurethat this is seen as Africa’s war, supported by France and others, rather thana remake of Afghanistan. Just as importantly, Algeria’s cooperation must besecured. By accepting the overflight of its territory by French combat aircraftand closing its border with Mali, Algiers has displayed a new spirit in theinternational fight against cross-border terrorism.
If confirmed, this shift could be critical, as theretreating jihadis get caught between the hammer of French and Africanintervention and the anvil of Algeria’s combat helicopters and desert fighters.However, such a stance will come with a price for French diplomacy, with itspolicy of choosing Morocco in its perennial standoff with Algeria. PresidentFrancois Hollande, as commander-in-chief, has proven that he can actdecisively. Now comes a severe test of political and diplomatic skill.
Francois Heisbourg is special adviser at the Fondation pourla Recherche Strategique, a Paris-based think-tank
