After almost two years of civil war, there are no longer twooptions for Syria, political or military. Both sides now rely on force. Theopposition activists who try to maintain the originally peaceful character oftheir uprising are still there, but the armed rebels are calling the shots.Those in the regime who wanted to engage the opposition in some form ofdialogue were marginalized early on, when Bashar al-Assad chose to respond tothe protests with force.
Eventually there will have to be a political process. Butthe conditions under which such a process will come about now largely depend onmilitary developments on the ground “ plus, to some extent, on the signals andactions of international players. But if both sides are now using militarymeans for political ends, the ends differ. For the opposition, the military struggleis a means to support the initially civilian uprising. It considers thecivilian population, even in regime-controlled territory, as its base, and itaims to depose the regime by gaining military and political ground.
Militarily, Assad is now relying almost totally on loyalistsfrom his Alawite sect who dominate the senior officer corps. The mainly Alawiteelite battalions and the air force are still largely intact, and supported onthe ground by hastily recruited militias “ the so-called shabiha “ which havebeen responsible for most of the atrocities against civilians. With the risingbrutality, the war has increasingly turned into a sectarian conflict.Propaganda depicting the Alawites as the enemy has been on the increase amongthe majority Sunnis, and some extremist groups have targeted Alawites. As aresult, many Alawites are now prepared to fight on Assad’s side not out ofconviction, but out of fear that if he falls they and their families will beslaughtered. Without assurances for their future, the elite battalions, airforce, intelligence services and shabiha will fight on simply to secure thesurvival of their community, possibly in an Alawite enclave in the coastalmountains.
Certainly the regime is to blame for the destruction ofSyria’s social fabric, but this does not help to repair the damage. The morethe opposition advances, the more it also becomes responsible for rescuing andrebuilding the state. The opposition has taken an important step by forming theNational Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. It now has acredible leadership with better contacts to the Local Coordination Committeesand other civilian groups inside Syria, and it has made progress towardunifying the diverse forces of the Free Syrian Army and other armed groupsunder one military command.
Parallel with the military struggle, though, the oppositionhas to present itself as a credible alternative to the regime. Among otherthings, the Coalition needs to start providing services in liberated areas,particularly by distributing relief aid to residents and refugees. At the sametime, the Free Syrian Army needs to distance itself from extremist forces.Opposition leaders obviously appreciate the fighting power of these groups.Politically, however, the opposition cannot win with forces whose actions andpropaganda exacerbate the fears of those Syrians who oppose the regime but fearthat its fall will lead to more bloodshed and repression.
Thanks to their personal histories, leaders of the Coalitionsuch as Ahmad Moaz al-Khatib, Riad Seif and Suhair al-Atassi are well placed tooffer a vision of coexistence to those, particularly Alawites, who have so farstuck with the regime. The appointment of an Alawite as ambassador to Paris wasa good signal, but it is not enough to reassure the community that it will havea place in a post-Assad Syria.
International actors do have an impact in Syria, even in theopposition. The main means of strengthening those who want to build ademocratic and inclusive post-Assad Syria is to unify the flow of money andmaterial support. The better the Coalition and the Free Syrian Army are able topay their soldiers and dispense the necessary equipment, other militias andgroups will submit to their leadership.
This would increase civilian control over the militarycomponent of the rebellion, weaken extremist groups and improve chances for apolitical transition.
Volker Perthes is director of the German Institute forInternational and Security Affairs in Berlin
