Theprotection of children from sexual offences was never intended to become aninstrument of institutional intimidation. Yet, within educational institutions,the increasing reliance upon internally constituted inquiry and disciplinarycommittees has raised an uncomfortable legal question. Can a school entrustedwith educating children simultaneously assume the functions of investigator,prosecutor and adjudicator when allegations of sexual misconduct arise?
Suchcommittees are frequently presented as mechanisms of child protection. However,their composition, independence and procedures deserve scrutiny. Where membersare appointed by the same management whose reputation may be affected by acomplaint, an inherent risk of institutional bias is created. The possibilityof selective treatment, vindictive disciplinary action or reputational damagecontrol cannot be dismissed.
TheProtection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO), was enacted tosafeguard children through a specialised statutory framework, not to legitimiseimprovised disciplinary tribunals.
Statutory boundaries
UnderSection 19 of POCSO, information concerning an actual or apprehended sexualoffence against a child must be reported to the Special Juvenile Police Unit orlocal police. No preliminary determination of guilt by a school committee hasbeen prescribed as a condition for reporting.
Thisdistinction was reinforced by the Supreme Court in AAA v Linda Sema (2026),reported as 2026 INSC 675. The Court examined the failure of school authoritiesto report an allegation of sexual assault after undertaking their ownverification.
Itwas clarified that school authorities cannot substitute internal investigationsfor the statutory reporting process. The obligation arises upon receipt ofcredible information, without requiring the institution to establish theoffence independently.
Importantly,criminal responsibility for non-reporting was examined individually. Liabilitywas not automatically imposed upon every teacher or official associated withthe institution.
Thejudgment consequently establishes an important boundary between administrativesafeguarding and criminal investigation.
Juvenile safeguards
Thediscussion becomes particularly significant when the person accused is also aminor.
Section34 of POCSO expressly requires a child alleged to have committed an offenceunder the Act to be dealt with in accordance with the Juvenile Justice (Careand Protection of Children) Act, 2015.
TheJuvenile Justice framework recognises the presumption of innocence, dignity,participation, legal assistance and age-appropriate treatment. Such safeguardscannot be displaced merely because allegations originate within schoolpremises.
Achild subjected to questioning by teachers, administrators or disciplinarycommittee members may face considerable psychological pressure. The authorityordinarily exercised by educators can create an environment in whichdisagreement, silence or hesitation may be misunderstood as misconduct.
Itis therefore necessary that parental or guardian involvement, access toappropriate counselling, and independent child-protection assistance beincorporated into school safeguarding procedures. Qualified psychologistsshould be available where necessary, without psychological assessment beingconverted into an informal test of guilt.
Lessons from Goa
Thecontroversy reported concerning Manovikas High School, Margao, illustrates whyinstitutional procedures deserve independent scrutiny.
Accordingto a report published by Goa in Sight on November 14, 2026, a complaintsubmitted by the school to Fatorda Police Station in October 2025 wassubsequently examined by police.
Thenewspaper attributed serious observations to the police inquiry report,including alleged procedural irregularities, pressure upon minor students tosubmit complaints, failure to produce requested CCTV recordings and denial ofan opportunity for the accused child to present his account.
Thereport further indicated that video material submitted against the childallegedly showed him being subjected to ragging.
Theseremain reported findings requiring examination against the complete policerecord.
Nevertheless,the controversy demonstrates why disciplinary authority must remain subject toindependent scrutiny. Where an institutional inquiry itself becomes the subjectof allegations concerning coercion or false implication, the credibility of theentire safeguarding process may be compromised.
False accusations
Parliamentanticipated the possibility of false allegations when enacting POCSO.
Section22(3) prescribes punishment where an adult knowingly makes a false complaint orsupplies false information against a child, thereby victimising that childunder the Act.
Conversely,Section 19(7) protects persons who report suspected offences in good faith.
Theseprovisions must be read together. Genuine complainants must not be discouragedfrom approaching the authorities, while knowingly fabricated accusations mustnot be permitted to acquire legitimacy merely through institutionalendorsement.
Independent oversight
Thecontinued necessity of school inquiry committees must be evaluated againsttheir actual statutory functions.
Theirlegitimate responsibilities should be confined to receiving information,ensuring immediate safety, preserving evidence, facilitating counselling andreporting suspected offences to competent authorities.
Criminalinvestigation and determination of responsibility must remain with institutionsempowered by law.
Clearwritten protocols should require the participation of parents or appropriateguardians, protection against coercive questioning, confidential documentationand referral to qualified child-protection professionals. Independent oversightshould be available where school management itself faces allegations ofimproper conduct.
Ultimately,educational institutions cannot claim to protect childhood while denyingchildren the procedural dignity guaranteed by law. The reputation of a school,however prestigious, cannot supersede statutory safeguards.
Themeasure of a school's commitment to child protection must therefore be foundnot in the authority exercised by its committees, but in its willingness tosurrender investigative control to the institutions legally entrusted withdetermining the truth.
