A constitutional democracy rests on a simple principle that every eligible citizen must be able to exercise the right to vote. When that right is threatened due to inherent electoral process flaws, transparency becomes a question. The controversy over the Election Commission of India’s (ECI) Special Intensive Revision (SIR) exercise, which saw more than 13 crore names removed from draft electoral rolls across 30 States and Union Territories, has now become a serious test of public confidence in the electoral process.
The apparent disagreement within the three-member Election Commission makes the situation even more glaring. Written records show that Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi raised objections at least 14 times over 10 months to key decisions that, they argued, were taken without adequate oversight by the full Commission.
Their concerns included allocating work without proper scrutiny of the IT architecture, as well as changes to procedures governing the deletion and restoration of voters. Sandhu described some of these actions as “unauthorised and illegal”, while Joshi cautioned against what he called the “gradual centralisation” of the electoral roll database. When members of a constitutional body feel compelled to approach the Cabinet Secretary to protect internal checks and balances, it is difficult to treat it as an ordinary administrative disagreement.
Goa provides a particularly stark example of what can happen when authority and software controls do not align. Following Supreme Court directions, the state’s electoral machinery held hearings for voters flagged for “logical discrepancies,” examined their documents, and found 97 citizens eligible for inclusion in the rolls.
Under Sections 21 and 21A of the Representation of the People Act, the authority to prepare and finalise electoral rolls rests with the local Electoral Registration Officers (EROs). Yet, despite eight communications from Goa’s Chief Electoral Officer over seven days and specific instructions from the Deputy Election Commissioner in Delhi, the ECINet platform reportedly had no facility to roll back deletions or restore the names of voters who had been cleared for inclusion. The EROs had exercised their statutory authority, but the software permissions required to implement those decisions were controlled by the IT division in New Delhi. When the final rolls were published on February 21, all 97 voters who were found eligible remained excluded.
We recall that, in West Bengal, the deletion of 2.7 million names during the SIR exercise sparked strong political opposition, with political parties attributing changes in electoral outcomes to the deletions and demanding accountability. At the national level, opposition parties have also questioned the appointment mechanism introduced by the 2023 Act and raised concerns that centralised control of ERONet could affect the independence of the electoral process. These are serious allegations and must be examined based on evidence rather than political assertion.
The larger question, however, is whether software can prevent EROs from implementing a decision that the law empowers them to take. The claim that thousands of independent EROs are protecting the integrity of the electoral roll becomes hollow in the current situation. Technology should strengthen the exercise, not stand in the way.
The ECI therefore needs to address these concerns with urgency. Software permissions must be aligned with the powers granted to EROs under the law, the functioning of ECINet must be subject to review, and differences within the Commission itself must be resolved through collective decision-making. Administrative efficiency may be important, but it cannot come at the cost of transparency and the right to vote.
